




Suffering points to experiences of physical or mental pain. Suffering and the act of reflecting on 
the nature of suffering is a central question in philosophy, religion, psychology, and the social 
sciences. On the one hand, suffering is a deeply personal and individual experience, one which 
escapes easy definitions and representation (Wilkinson, 2005). However, on the other hand social 
suffering points to suffering as a societal experience, and in such instances suffering is the result of 
what political, economic, and institutional powers do to people (or other sentient creatures) 
(Kleinman, Das, & Lock, 1997). In humanitarian contexts, suffering is a mobilizing force: witnessing 
the suffering of others triggers compassion and empathy and emotion-driven ethical responses to 
such suffering, which sometimes leads to humanitarian responses and action (Ashby & Brown, 
2009). 
Jeremy Bentham (1789) identified the ability to suffer as the precondition for protection against 
exploitation and exposure to cruelty, a requirement for (human) rights. He famously proposed 
that the question is not, “Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1758) described compassion for the suffering other as 
one of the “original passions of human nature.” Compassion towards the suffering of others is 
undoubtedly as old as human culture, but the idea of a universal humanity and a global human 
community with transboundary moral obligations towards each other—and therefore, towards 
alleviating the suffering of others—is often traced back to the Enlightenment era.  During the 
Enlightenment, a cult of sensibility and fascination with suffering prompted a surge in 
humanitarian thinking and action. At the time, the rise of secular thinking gave voice to the idea 
that humans themselves could and should intervene in the suffering of others—even unknown, 
distant humans that remain anonymous to us—which helped sow the seeds of modern 
humanitarian thinking. The recognition of a shared human condition, one bound together with 
bodily precarity and vulnerability to suffering, formed the basis for ideas of a common human 
community and the obligation of humans themselves to safeguard our fragile humanity (Sliwinski, 
2011; Ashby & Brown, 2009).  
According to Hannah Arendt, humanitarianism builds on a “politics of pity,” and it divides us 
between those who suffer and those who do not, those in need of help and those able to help. 
Therefore, humanitarianism is dependent on the spectacle of suffering, that is, on mediating 
representations of the suffering of others in the awareness of distant, able-to-help spectators 
(Arendt 1963). Witnessing the suffering of another, recognizing it as suffering, and reacting to the 
suffering in a compassioned manner, with a will to help, is at the core of humanitarianism. The 
evolution of transboundary humanitarianism, and its institutionalism and expansion, may be 
traced through episodes of witnessing extreme suffering and organizing benevolent, humanitarian 
responses to it (Kotilainen, 2016; Sliwinski, 2011; Ashby & Brown, 2009). 
The birth of modern organizational humanitarianism is often dated back to 1859, in the aftermath 
of the Battle of Solferino. Deeply impacted by the suffering that he saw and heard at the scene of 
battle, Henry Dunant wrote “Memory of Solferino” (1862). Inspired by the ideas presented in the 
book, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was founded in 1863. Similarly, the 
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anti-slavery movement led to recognition of the suffering of slaves, of slaves as humans capable of 
suffering and who should not suffer (Sliwinski, 2011; Hochschild, 2005). Perhaps most famously, 
the horrors of the Second World War, and namely witnessing the immense suffering of those 
affected by the Holocaust, prompted the codification of international humanitarian laws and 
implementation of conventions aiming to protect humanity from future atrocities and rights 
violations. More recently, driven by the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities committed during 
the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was signed in 
2005 by all of the UN member states.  
A critical question is:  What is it that counts as a life (to our understanding) able to suffer, a life we 
feel compassion for, a life worthy of grief and mourning? (Butler, 2004). This question is pertinent 
today with respect to, for instance, the case of legal, mass-scale exploitation of non-human 
animals and the issue of animal rights.  
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